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ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL
NULLIFICATION OF FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE
ACTION LAW
Russell W. Galloway, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, the concept of affirmative action has
generated substantial public interest and debate. Civil rights
advocates have urged that affirmative action is a necessary
method for neutralizing the preferences enjoyed by white males
in our society and for eradicating the continuing effects of past
racial and sexual discrimination. Opponents have replied that
affirmative action is itself an illegal form of "reverse discrimi-
nation" which should be eradicated as soon as possible.'
In the midst of this debate, an important aspect of the
issue tends to be overlooked, namely, the degree to which exist-
ing affirmative action requirements are being undercut by re-
luctant administrators and judges. There is much evidence
with regard to the affirmative action compliance system which
suggests that "administrative nullification" is occurring, i.e.,
that the official compliance agencies are failing to enforce ap-
plicable regulations.' This article will describe the pattern of
administrative nullification, illustrate the judicial response to
that pattern, and propose needed changes in the judicial review
of the federal compliance system.
FEDERAL CONTRACTORS AND AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
Executive Order 11246
The federal affirmative action compliance system is based
upon Executive Order 11246,1 the most recent in a series of
executive orders dealing with the employment practices of fed-
eral contractors.' The first of these orders was issued by Presi-
* Member of the California Bar; Staff Attorney for the Affirmative Action Com-
pliance Unit of Legal Aid Society of Alameda County; J.D. 1965, Columbia University
School of Law; Ph.D. 1970, Graduate Theological Union.
1. Cf. Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 18 Cal. 3d 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132
Cal. Rptr. 668 (1976) (California Supreme Court struck down affirmative action admis-
sions program of University of California at Davis Medical School as constituting
reverse discrimination).
2. See text accompanying notes 24-59 infra.
3. 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
4. For more thorough discussions of the history of the federal affirmative action
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dent Franklin D. Roosevelt in 1941. 5 After modifications by
Presidents Roosevelt, Truman and Eisenhower, the concept of
''affirmative action" was introduced by President Kennedy in
1961.6 Executive Order 11246, was issued by President Johnson
in 1965 and was amended by him in 1967 to prohibit sexual as
well as racial discrimination.
Executive Order 11246 mandates that a specific "equal
opportunity provision" be inserted in the body of all federal
contracts.7 The explicit requirement that the contractor under-
take affirmative action to ensure that all persons are given
equal opportunity for initial employment, training, promotions
and all other terms and conditions of employment is the most
important portion of the provision."
Enforcement responsibility is delegated by the terms of
the Executive Order to the Secretary of the Department of
Labor.' In carrying out this responsibility, the Secretary of
Labor has issued administrative regulations which have the
force and effect of statutes enacted by Congress."
The most important of the regulations issued pursuant to
Executive Order 11246 is Revised Order No. 4. 1 This order
describes in detail the written affirmative action program
system, see, e.g., Farmer v. Philadelphia Elec. Co., 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964); Legal
Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal docketed sub nom.
Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974); Nash, Affirmative Action under Execu-
tive Order 11246, 46 N.Y.U.L. REv. 225 (1971).
5. Exec. Order No. 8802, 6 Fed. Reg. 3109 (1941).
6. Exec. Order No. 10,925, 26 Fed. Reg. 1977 (1961).
7. Exceptions are spelled out in § 204 of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg.
12,319 (1965).
8. Section 202(i) of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), states:
The contractor will take affirmative action to ensure that applicants are
employed, and that employees are treated during employment, without
regard to their race, color, religion, sex or national origin. Such action
shall include, but not be limited to the following: employment, upgrad-
ing, demotion, or transfer; recruitment or recruitment advertising; layoff
or termination; rates of pay or other forms of compensation; and selection
for training, including apprenticeship.
9. Section 201 of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965), states:
The Secretary of Labor shall be responsible for the administration of
Parts II [covering service and supply contractors] and III [covering
construction contractors] of this Order. ...
10. See, e.g., Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 539 (1959); Service v. Dulles, 354
U.S. 363, 372 (1957); Peters v. Hobby, 349 U.S. 331, 345 (1954).
11. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2 (1976). In late 1976, the Department of Labor published a
notice of proposed rule-making which contained proposed regulations which would, if
adopted, substantially modify Revised Order No. 4. The proposed regulations have




(AAP) required of federal contractors having contracts exceed-
ing $50,000 and fifty or more employees. Revised Order No. 4
converts the general requirement of affirmative action con-
tained in Executive Order 11246 into specific operational re-
quirements designed to eradicate discrimination by federal
contractors.
The fundamental requirement of the order is that the con-
tractor must make every good faith effort to correct promptly
any underutilization of minorities and women in its work force.
"Underutilizaton" exists whenever the percentage of minorities
or women employed by the contractor is lower than the percen-
tage of minorities and women with requisite skills available for
that type of work in the applicable labor market area.'2 The
AAP which each contractor is required to prepare and annually
revise must contain a utilization analysis of its work force.,,
This analysis must set forth, for each job group, a definition of
the company's labor market area and a statement of minority
and female availability. 4 The utilization analysis must also set
forth the present racial and sexual composition of each specific
job group. Wherever the analysis indicates that the percentage
of minorities or women employed by the contractor is lower
than their availability in the labor area, the contractor has the
duty to make "every good faith effort" to correct the underutili-
zation in the minimum feasible period of time. 5
To illustrate how this system works, assume: (1) that X
Corporation has one hundred clerical workers; (2) that thirty
percent of the employed and unemployed clerical workers in
the labor area of X Corporation are nonwhite; and (3) that only
ten percent or ten of the one hundred clerical workers at X
Corporation are nonwhite. In such a case, X Corporation has
an underutilization of nonwhite clerical workers. Therefore, X
Corporation has the duty to make every good faith effort to
correct the underutilization, i.e., to reach at least the thirty
percent availability figure, as soon as possible.
Revised Order No. 4 contains a list of specific actions
which should be undertaken as part of the companies' good
12. Factors to be considered in determining the contractor's "labor area" are set
forth at 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.11 (1976).
13. Id.
14. The determination of "availability" is based on a detailed analysis of eight
specific factors including population statistics, work force statistics, unemployment
statistics and available training and recruitment resources. Id.
15. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.12(c) (1976).
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faith effort to correct their deficiencies. The contractor must
commit itself to specific and result-oriented procedures de-
signed to increase materially the utilization of minorities and
women where deficiencies exist."8 It must develop and imple-
ment "action oriented programs" designed to correct its defi-
ciencies." It must cooperate with community training, job-
development and referral programs, provide training where
feasible, cease using discriminatory job requirements, affirma-
tively recruit minorities and women, and provide career coun-
selling programs for minority and female employees.'8
The Structure of the Federal Compliance System
The Secretary of Labor created the Office of Federal Con-
tract Compliance Programs (OFCCP) to bear the general re-
sponsibility for ensuring that federal contractors comply with
the affirmative action requirements of Executive Order 11246.
The OFCCP, in turn, has delegated primary responsibility for
enforcement of the Executive Order to a number of other fed-
eral agencies.
The compliance program has two major segments: con-
struction and nonconstruction. Each federal agency is responsi-
ble for ensuring compliance by construction contractors who
work on projects receiving federal aid which that agency ad-
ministers. With regard to nonconstruction, or service and sup-
ply, contracts, compliance responsibility has been delegated to
several federal agencies referred to as the "compliance agen-
cies." Each compliance agency is responsible for service and
supply contractors within a specified part of the private sec-
tor.'9 The compliance agency assignments, in a simplified out-
line, are indicated in Table 1.
16. Id. § 60-2.10.
17. Id. § 60-2.13(f).
18. See, e.g., 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-2.13, .24, .26 (1976). For the sake of clarity itshould
be noted that Revised Order No. 4 does not apply to construction contractors. Affirma-
tive action requirements concerning construction workers are contained in a series, of
separate area plans issued by the Department of Labor. These plans normally impose
percentage minority work force goals by trade for the entire construction work force of
the federal contractor throughout the county in which the federally assisted construc-
tion project is located. Construction contractors are not required to have a written AAP
for their construction work force. Instead they are required to undertake a series of
enumerated efforts to reach the percentage goals set forth in the relevant Department
of Labor area plan.
19. The designation of the compliance agencies and definition of the compliance
jurisdiction of each are spelled out in an OFCCP directive known as Revised Order No.
[Vol. 17
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TABLE 1
Compliance Agency Assignment
Department of Agriculture Food processing
Department of Commerce Shipyards; water transportation
Department of Defense Manufacturing (durable goods)
Energy Research and Development
Administration Chemicals; glass
General Services Administration Utilities; retail stores; paper; wood;
real estate; surface transportation
(trucking, railroad, bus)
Department of Health Education
and Welfare Educational institutions; hospitals
Department of Interior Oil; mining; rubber; hotels
Federal Aviation Administration Airlines
Department of Treasury Banks; insurance
Veterans Administration Drugs
The basic duty of each agency is to ensure that the nonex-
empt federal contractors within its jurisdiction fulfill their af-
firmative action requirements. If the contractor is subject to
Revised Order No. 4, the compliance agency must ensure that
the contractor has an acceptable AAP and that the AAP is fully
implemented. In order to make this determination, the agen-
cies undertake compliance reviews of their assigned contrac-
tors. 10 The reviews include two components; a "desk review" of
the contractor's AAP and supporting documents and an "on-
site review" to determine whether the program is being imple-
mented. If a company has no program, has an inadequate pro-
gram, or fails to implement its program, the agency is required
to issue an order requesting the company to explain its appar-
ent failure." Where the company does not justify past noncom-
pliance and take the necessary steps to comply with require-
ments, the agency is required to carry out sanction proceed-
1. The method of assignment is based upon the Standard Industrial Code (SIC), a
system which classifies private industry in functional divisions (such as banks, food
processing companies, heavy equipment manufacturers, etc.). Thus each compliance
agency has responsibility for monitoring the affirmative action programs of all service
and supply contractors having certain SIC numbers.
20. Mandatory compliance review procedures are spelled out in Revised Order
No. 14. 41 C.F.R. § 60-60 (1976).
21. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c) (1976).
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ings.11 Contract termination and declaration of ineligibility for
future contracts are available as penalties."
ADMINISTRATIVE NULLIFICATION OF FEDERAL AFFIRMATIVE ACTION
REQUIREMENTS
Viewed as a whole, the federal regulations are comprehen-
sive and far-reaching requirements which, if enforced, could
result in very significant progress toward equal employment
opportunity. Thus, it is important that these regulations be
rigorously enforced and that federal contractors obey the af-
firmative action requirements contained in their contracts. If
such enforcement were provided, full utilization of minorities
and women would soon be achieved.
During recent years, major studies have been made to ex-
amine the effectiveness of the compliance system." These
studies have uniformly found that the system has not per-
formed effectively. As early as 1970, the United States Com-
mission on Civil Rights (Civil Rights Commission) pointed out
that, despite the potential effectiveness of federal affirmative
action requirements, very little had actually been achieved.25
Similarly, in 1975 the General Accounting Office (GAO), the
official investigating arm of Congress, concluded that "[the
Department's administration of the [Executive Order 11246]
program has not been adequate. '2 In addition, the Civil Rights
Commission's Letter of Transmittal of May, 1976, which ac-
companies the 1976 report The Challenge Ahead, states: "We
have found further that Federal programs to provide equal
employment opportunity in the affected industries largely have
been ineffective. '27
These reports, highly critical of federal compliance agen-
cies, support the conclusion that the federal compliance pro-
gram has failed to secure enforcement of affirmative action
22. Id. § 60-2.2(c)(2).
23. Id.
24. See, e.g., GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, THE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
PROGRAM FOR FEDERAL NONCONSTRUCTION CONTRACTORS CAN BE IMPROVED (1975)
[hereinafter cited as EQUAL EMPLOYMENT]; GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, MORE ACTION
NEEDED TO INSURE THAT FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS PROVIDE EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY (1976); U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, THE CHALLENGE AHEAD (1976)
[hereinafter cited as CHALLENGE AHEAD]; U.S. COMM'N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, ANN. REP.,
FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT (1970-75) [hereinafter cited as ENFORCEMENT].
25. 1970 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 24, at 134.
26. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at 7.
27. CHALLENGE AHEAD, supra note 24, at i.
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requirements. At least five separate factors have contributed to
this failure.
Understaffing
There are far too few compliance officers to cover the vast
number of federal contractors. As a result, many contractors
are not reviewed at all, and those which are reviewed are not
reviewed with sufficient frequency to create a sense of account-
ability. The 1975 GAO report concluded that "[m]ost compli-
ance agencies were not reviewing an adequate proportion of the
contractors for which they were responsible."2" According to the
report, only 14.9% of the compliance universe was reviewed
during fiscal 1973.25 At this rate, without allowing for follow-up
reviews, contractors can be reviewed on the average only once
every seven years. Table 2 reveals that some of the agencies had
even worse records. 30
TABLE 2
Assigned % Reviewed
Agency Facilities (Fiscal '73)
Department of Agriculture 21,200 4%
Department of Health, Education
and Welfare 4,110 9%
Department of Treasury 6,000 8%
Veterans Administration 12,480 1%
As a result of staff limitations, the Department of Defense
(DOD) rarely reviews establishments with fewer than 200 em-
ployees, a group comprising two-thirds of its assigned contrac-
tors within the western region, Region 9.31 Staff limitations
were so severe within the postal service during 1974 and 1975
that the agency essentially discontinued its enforcement func-
28. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at ii.
29. Id. at 33.
30. Id.; see Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 137 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
appeal docketed sub non. Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974) (the United
States Department of Agriculture can only review its contractors once every 22 1/2
years on the average).
31. Deposition of Harry Winton (former director of DOD's compliance program
for Region 9), at 93, Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, No. 73-282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973) [on
file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.j (During the course of litigation at the trial level, the name
Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan was changed to Castillo v. Usery. To avoid confusion,
subsequent references to this case will be cited as Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan).
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tion altogether.2 James Southard, director of the General Serv-
ices Administration (GSA) compliance program for Region 9,
estimated that it would require "thousands" of compliance of-
ficers to attain "adequate" review coverage; in contrast, the
actual number of compliance officers is sixteen.3 Edward
Mitchell, national director of the GSA compliance program,
projected that there will be 120 reviews during fiscal 1977 in the
entire surface transportation industry, which has an estimated
67,000 nonexempt establishments. 4
Lack of Compliance Data
There is no general reporting required of federal contrac-
tors during the long periods before their first review and be-
tween reviews. EEO-1 reports" are submitted on an annual
basis to the OFCCP, but are not distributed to the compliance
agencies.3" The agencies often receive no work force data on
individual contractors except at the time of a complete compli-
ance review. Indeed, they cannot request an assigned contrac-
tor to submit its AAP without performing a full review. 7
Efforts to improve the reporting system have met opposi-
tion within the executive branch and from the contractors.
Several years ago, for example, the OFCCP developed a self-
review and reporting format known as "Forms A and B" to be
completed and submitted on an annual basis by contractors.
The proposed forms were blocked by the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB).3 s Since that time, the OFCCP has stalled
32. Deposition of Clarence Featherson (former national director of the Postal
Service compliance program), at 30-32, id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.]; Deposi-
tion of George Sirls (Postal Service compliance officer for Northern California), at 25-
29, id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.]. The Postal Service has since been relieved of
its compliance duties. Its contractors have been added to those of the GSA.
33. Deposition of James P. Southard, at 18-19, id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L.
REV.1.
34. Deposition of Edward Mitchell, at 29, id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
At this rate it would take roughly 560 years to complete reviews of all establishments.
35. EEO-1 reports or Employer Information Reports are work force reports sub-
mitted to the Joint Reporting Committee of the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission and the OFCCP, in compliance with OFCCP Directive No. 1. EEO-1
reports contain information concerning the general make-up of a company's employees
by race, sex and job category.
36. Deposition of Edward E. Mitchell (national director of GSA's compliance
program), at 64, Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, No. 73-282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973) [on
file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.]; deposition of James P. Southard (director of GSA's
compliance program for Region 9), at 44-45, id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
37. 41 C.F.R. § 60-60.7 (1976).
38. Deposition of Edward E. Mitchell, at 74-77, Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, No.
[Vol. 17
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general reporting requirements by ordering agencies to discon-
tinue existing progress report systems and by refusing all pro-
posals to implement a standard report system."
After inquiring into this issue, the General Accounting Off-
ice concluded: "Nine years have passed since Executive Order
11246 was issued, but the Department does not yet have a fully
operational system to measure the Federal nonconstruction
contractors' progress in improving the employment of minori-
ties and women."'" In a system characterized by gross under-
staffing, the failure to require regular noncompliance data is
fatal to efficient enforcement. Without such data, compliance
cannot be detected, rational priorities cannot be established,
nor can progress be measured.
Failure to Impose Sanctions
Since most contractors are subject to compliance reviews
very rarely, if at all, and there is no reporting system to enable
agencies to monitor performance during the periods when no
reviews occur, most noncompliance is simply undetected. In
this situation, the only available method for motivating federal
contractors to comply with their affirmative action require-
ments is to ensure that when noncompliance is detected, it will
be punished. The importance of deterrence in the enforcement
of equal employment opportunity laws has been explicitly rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court in Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody. 41
Several steps are involved in the sanction procedures
available in cases where federal contractors are in noncompli-
73-282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REV.].
39. In September, 1976, the OFCCP published a proposed new regulation (to
have been codified in 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.13) which could have resolved this problem by
requiring the annual submission of AAP summaries and progress reports. 41 Fed. Reg.
40,339 (1976). This regulation, however, was not adopted.
40. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at 7.
41. In Albemarle, the Court stated that the primary objective of Title VII was
prophylactic. In considering an award of backpay, it found that backpay had an ob-
vious connection with this purpose. It stated:
If employers faced only the prospect of an injunctive order, they would
have little incentive to shun practices of dubious legality. It is the reason-
ably certain prospect of a backpay award that "provide[s] the spur or
catalyst which causes employers and unions to self-examine and to self-
evaluate their employment practices and to endeavor to eliminate, so far
as possible, the last vestiges of an unfortunate and ignominious page in
this country's history . ...
422 U.S. 405, 417-18 (1975) (citation omitted).
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ance with their affirmative action requirements. First, when
noncompliance is detected, the compliance officer must notify
officials of the appropriate compliance agency and the OFCCP
of such fact.4" The compliance agency is required to issue a
"show cause notice" whenever administrative enforcement is
contemplated.4 3 Thereafter, if the contractor fails to show good
cause for noncompliance or fails to submit an acceptable AAP,
the agency is to send to the Director a written request for en-
forcement proceedings." Finally, sanctions may be imposed
unless the contractor convinces an administrative judge or the
Director of OFCCP that they should not be.45 The federal com-
pliance agencies have failed to apply these sanction procedures
vigorously. This failure is evident at each of the three proce-
dural levels.
The compliance agencies have issued surprisingly few
show cause notices. The 1974 figures for some of the compliance
agencies are set forth in Table 3.11
TABLE 3
REVIEWS AND SHOW CAUSE NOTICES
FISCAL YEAR 1974
Show Cause
Compliance Agency Reviews Notices
No.
Atomic Energy Commission 592 16 2.7%
Department of Agriculture 565 12 2.1%
Department of Commerce 146 0 0.0%
General Services Administration 2,523 146 5.8%
Department of Interior 577 5 0.8%
Department of Treasury 385 1 0.2%
Veterans Administration 148 6 4.0%
On the basis of such data, the GAO concluded that compliance
agencies issued show cause notices in only 1.2% of the total
reviews conducted during the period from July 1, 1971 through
March 31, 1974.1' Similarly, the Civil Rights Commission has
42. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c)(1) (1976).
43. Id.
44. Id. § 60-2.2(c)(2).
45. Id. § 60-1.26.
46. 1974 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 24, at 392.
47. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at 27.
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found that the following percentages of contractors reviewed
received show cause notices: 1971, 2%; 1972, 2%; 1973, 3.2%;
1974, 3.6%. 48
In the few cases where show cause notices are issued, the
agencies almost invariably withdraw the show cause notices
and rarely issue notices of proposed sanctions. For example, the
Civil Rights Commission found that only two notices of pro-
posed debarment were issued during fiscal 1974 and the first
half of 1975."9 This failure is due, in large part, to a misinterpre-
tation of an OFCCP regulation governing the issuance of no-
tices of proposed sanctions. The regulation"° requires the issu-
ance of notices of proposed sanctions whenever contractors
found guilty of noncompliance are unable to show good cause
therefore-regardless of promises of future compliance. The
agencies have instead interpreted the regulation as prohibiting
the issuance of notices of proposed sanctions in all cases where
the contractor submits an acceptable prospective AAP. This
interpretation, which was specifically rejected in Castillo v.
Usery,5' allowed contractors to escape sanctions for noncompli-
ance, no matter how severe, merely by submitting a formally
correct AAP.
Additional proof concerning the failure of the compliance
agencies to use authorized enforcement proceedings is their
extremely limited use of sanctions against contractors. On this
issue, the Civil Rights Commission found that:
As of February, 1975, only nine companies had been de-
barred in the 10 years since the Executive Order was is-
sued. . . . Six of the nine debarred companies were small
48. 1974 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 24, at 296-97.
49. Id. at 298-99.
50. 41 C.F.R. § 60-2.2(c)(1) (1976) (current version at 42 Fed. Reg. 3462 (1977))
stated:
If the contractor fails to show good cause for his failure or fails to
remedy that failure by developing and implementing an acceptable af-
firmative action program within 30 days, the compliance agency, upon
the approval of the Director, shall immediately issue a notice of proposed
cancellation or termination of existing contracts or subcontracts and de-
barment from future contracts and subcontracts pursuant to § 60-1.26(b)
of this subchapter, giving the contractor 14 days to request a hearing. If
a request for hearing has not been received within 14 days from such
notice, such contractor will be declared ineligible for future contracts and
current contracts will be terminated for default.
51. No. 73-282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973) (order granting partial summary judgment,
Sept., 1976). Castillo v. Usery is the name used both on appeal and in later trial court
proceedings in the case formerly known as Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan.
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specialty construction contractors. . . The withholding
of progress payment was authorized in April, 1973, but as
of February, 1975, this sanction had never been used. 2
The GAO stated that "[t]he almost nonexistence of enforce-
ment actions taken could imply to contractors that the compli-
ance agencies do not intend to enforce the program."5
Conflicts of Interest Within the Agencies Responsible for
Enforcement
For several reasons, the institutions responsible for admin-
istering the compliance system are not unequivocally commit-
ted to effective enforcement of affirmative action. First, a con-
flict of interest pervades the compliance agencies. Primary re-
sponsibility for enforcing Executive Order 11246 has been dele-
gated to the agencies which are also responsible for the procure-
ment function of the federal government; the task of purchas-
ing goods and services for use by the government. Obviously,
the compliance and procurement functions involve conflicting
interests. Aggressive enforcement of affirmative action require-
ments could disrupt relations with the contractors supplying
goods and services to the government. This is particularly true
when it involves imposing sanctions such as contract cancella-
tion, suspension and debarment. For example, it is not surpris-
ing that the GSA, which must purchase paper supplies for the
entire federal bureaucracy, appears reluctant to terminate con-
tractual relationships with the paper companies over which it
has compliance jurisdiction. Similarly, it is difficult to believe
that the Department of Defense will dissolve its relationships
with defense contractors because of their civil rights posture.
Second, the opposition to effective affirmative action en-
forcement is not limited to the compliance agencies; it lies at
the heart of the enforcement system, within the Department of
Labor itself. A striking illustration of this point was the tenure
of Secretary of Labor Peter Brennan, executive director of the
New York Building Trades Council prior and subsequent to his
term as Secretary. During this period, the Department of Labor
issued a directive known as the "Brennan Memorandum,"
which declared that local affirmative action requirements
would not apply to construction projects involving federal as-
52. 1974 ENFORCEMENT, supra note 24, at 298-99.
53. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT, supra note 24, at 30.
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sistance.5 4 In effect, this was an attempt to use federal affirma-
tive action authority to hinder rather than further affirmative
action. The Department of Labor's loyalty to a primary consti-
tuency, the labor movement, which is often opposed to affirma-
tive action, creates a conflict of interest that tends to undercut
effective enforcement of affirmative action requirements.
Loopholes
The federal compliance system is further weakened by a
number of exemptions which cover important components of
the compliance universe. The most striking is the de facto ex-
emption of most of the surface transportation industry (truck-
ing, railroad and bus companies) from the requirements of Re-
vised Order No. 4.55 This order, with its crucial definition of the
affirmative action requirement, is applicable only where a con-
tractor has a contract in excess of $50,000. The surface trans-
portation industry, however, uses contracts, known as govern-
ment bills of lading or GBL's, which are always in small de-
nominations and rarely exceed $50,000.56 (The average GBL is
just over $200.) Therefore, Revised Order No. 4 is inapplicable
to nearly 100% of the surface transportation industry. Even if
a major contractor does millions of dollars of cumulative gov-
ernment business, it is not covered by Revised Order No. 4.
Despite the obvious irrationality of this exemption, the Depart-
ment of Labor resisted making the modification necessary to
bring the industry under Revised Order No. 4 until the eve of
trial in Castillo v. Usery.57
Another major loophole is created by the de facto exemp-
tion of small contractors from review coverage. Under opera-
ting procedures adopted by the DOD, facilities having fewer
than 200 employees are reviewed only in rare circumstances."
Similarly, GSA's insistence that its compliance officers average
500 employees per review, effectively excludes reviews of most
54. Percy v. Brennan, 384 F. Supp. 800 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
55. The legality of this exemption has been the subject of extensive litigation in
Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, No. 73-282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973).
56. The national director of the Postal Service compliance program has testified,
"I have never seen a $50,000 bill of lading." Deposition of Clarence Featherson, at 23,
id. [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.].
57. Under the new regulations, bills of lading are accumulated; if the aggregate
amount exceeds or can be expected to exceed $50,000 within a 12-month period the
company is within the coverage of the Order. 42 Fed. Reg. 3461 (1977) (to be codified
in 41 C.F.R. 60-2.(a)).
58. See note 31 & accompanying text supra.
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small companies. 9 Since the compliance system has no method
for obtaining work force data from and doing summary "desk
reviews" of these smaller contractors, they escape notice alto-
gether and are in effect totally exempt.
JUDICIAL RATIFICATION OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE NULLIFICATION OF
EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246
In light of the above-discussed enforcement problems, the
courts could help to ensure that federal contractors comply
with their affirmative action duties. 0 Since the agencies are
either unable or unwilling to require full compliance, the courts
could allow minorities and women, the intended beneficiaries
of Executive Order 11246, to bring suit against the individual
federal contractors and obtain court orders designed to attain
compliance. A private cause of action could be implied under
Executive Order 11246, allowing private parties to seek dam-
ages, specific performance or contract debarment for violations
of the standards established by the Order and the implement-
ing regulations. Alternatively, the same result could be accom-
plished by allowing minorities and women to sue as third party
beneficiaries of the affirmative action provisions contained in
the companies' federal contracts.'
59. Deposition of James P. Southard, at 62, Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, No. 73-
282 AJZ (N.D. Cal. 1973) [on file at SANTA CLARA L. REvj.
60. The Supreme Court has found the eradication of racial and sexual discrimi-
nation in employment to be of highest priority. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36, 47 (1974) (emphasis added), where the Court stated: "In the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 ... , Congress indicated that it considered the policy against dis-
crimination to be of the highest priority." In Franks v. Bowman Transp. Co., 432 U.S.
418 (1976), the Court again stated that "in enacting Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, Congress. . . ordained that its policy of outlawing. . . discrimination should
have the 'highest priority .... "
61. Although employment discrimination suits against federal contractors are
available under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 17
(1974), and the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1974), an action under
Executive Order 11,246 has certain advantages. The most important is that relief, i.e.,
the implementation of programs designed to achieve equal employment opportunity,
could be obtained without proof of past discrimination. The duty of federal contractors
to take affirmative action does not rest upon a finding of past discrimination. It arises
directly from the federal contract and the Executive Order. Far reaching orders based
upon federal regulations such as Revised Order No. 4 could be issued solely on the basis
of a showing that the contractor has failed to take the affirmative steps specified. In
addition, these orders could, in many cases, exceed the scope of relief which could be
granted under the above-mentioned statutes on the basis of evidence of discrimination.
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The "Private Cause of Action"
The official enforcement mechanism provided for Execu-
tive Order 11246 has broken down. It is understaffed, bereft of
information, compromised by conflicting interests and encum-
bered by red tape. In this situation, enforcement of the law
depends largely on allowing the persons who are the intended
beneficiaries of affirmative action requirements to bring suit
directly. There is no shortage of legal authority supporting the
right of the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action require-
ments to bring private enforcement actions. For example, the
Supreme Court's concept of the private attorney general allows
private parties to bring suit to vindicate the strong public pol-
icy against employment discrimination.2 Alternatively, pri-
vate persons are entitled to seek judicial enforcement of rules
when those persons are members of the class that the rules are
designed to protect, and the violations cause the kind of injury
that the law is designed to prevent. 3 Moreover, since the af-
firmative action requirements are contractual in nature and
specifically intended to benefit the protected classes, third
party beneficiary contract law is also potentially applicable.
Executive Order 11246 is receptive to the use of alternative
legal approaches. Section 202(6), the contract provision dealing
with sanctions for noncompliance, explicitly authorizes con-
tract cancellation, suspension and debarment. It incorporates
by reference an array of specific sanctions listed in section 209,
plus sanctions authorized by Department of Labor regulations,
and such additional sanctions and remedies as are "otherwise
provided by law." Section 202(6) states:
in the event of the contractor's noncompliance with
the nondiscrimination clauses of this contract or with any
of such rules, regulations, or orders, this contract may be
cancelled, terminated, or suspended in whole or in part
and the contractor may be declared ineligible for further
Government contracts in accordance with procedures au-
thorized in Executive Order No. 11246 of Sept. 24, 1965,
and such other sanctions may be imposed and remedies
invoked as provided in Executive Order 11246 of Sept. 24,
1965, or by rule, regulation, or order of the Secretary of
Labor, or as otherwise provided by law.64
62. See, e.g., Newman v. Piggie Park Enterprises, 390 U.S. 400, 402 (1968).
63. Cf. Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975) (no private remedy to enforce statute).
64. Exec. Order No. 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965).
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In short, there exists a national policy of highest priority,
an urgent need for private enforcement, several available legal
theories supporting private enforcement and an underlying law
that explicitly invites the use of all means of enforcement.
Despite these compelling considerations, the courts have re-
jected private enforcement of federal affirmative action duties.
The Farmer-Farkas rule. The leading cases on the issue
of whether a private cause of action exists to enforce Executive
Order 11246 are Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co. 5 and
Farkas v. Texas Instruments Inc."6 Since these two cases are
almost invariably relied upon in subsequent cases raising this
issue, they merit careful scrutiny.
Farmer v. Philadelphia Electric Co. involved a black line-
man who was discharged by the Philadelphia Electric Com-
pany for allegedly discriminatory reasons. The discharge oc-
curred prior to both the enactment of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 196467 and the resuscitation of the Civil Rights
Act of 1866;11 there was therefore no general prohibition of ra-
cial discrimination. Plaintiff argued that the defendant's con-
duct violated the Executive Order's nondiscrimination require-
ment, applicable to the company by virtue of its federal con-
tracts. After noting that the issues had not been raised before,
the court analyzed the Executive Order and concluded that it
did not authorize private persons to bring suit against contrac-
tors for discrimination.
The court discussed the history of the federal affirmative
action system at great length 9 and concluded that Executive
Order 11246 had the force and effect of law.7 It then turned its
attention to the issue of private enforcement and articulated
three reasons for dismissing the case. First, there was no ex-
press statement of intent in the Executive Order or elsewhere
to allow private suits against contractors.' Second, allowing
private persons to sue contractors directly would bypass the
administrative process, thus undermining the policy favoring
resolution of disputes through "conciliation" between the con-
65. 329 F.2d 3 (3d Cir. 1964).
66. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1967).
67. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to 17 (1970).
68. Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), which held that 42 U.S.C.
§ 1982, the housing provision of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, applies to private discrim-
ination.
69. 329 F.2d at 5-7.




tractor and compliance agency.7" Third, the court found that
plaintiffs had failed to exhaust available administrative reme-
dies by filing a complaint with the responsible federal agency.7
For a number of reasons, the court's analysis of the private
cause of action in the Farmer case should no longer be consid-
ered authoritative. First, the case was actually decided on the
ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies, and the
discussion of the private cause of action was dictum.74 Second,
the case rests on the now abandoned theory that private benefi-
ciaries of a law cannot sue to remedy violations unless the law
expressly or implicitly indicates a positive intent on the part
of the enacting body to allow such suits. Recent cases have held
that unless there is some indication of contrary intent, or unless
private involvement would interfere with enforcement, the
class of persons intended to be protected by a law may sue to
correct an injury that the law was designed to prevent.7" Thus,
the absence of any indication of presidential intent now leads
to the conclusion that the private cause of action does exist.
Third, the Farmer court failed to note the broad approach to
sanctions expressed in sections 202(6) and 209(a) of the Execu-
tive Order, particularly in the language authorizing the use of
all sanctions "otherwise provided by law." There is an impli-
cation in these sections that all available uses of the Executive
Order are to be made.
Finally, the context in which Farmer arose is important.
At the time, in 1964, there was no generally applicable prohibi-
tion of employment discrimination. Thus, creation of a private
cause of action under the Executive Order would have involved
a broad change of social policy.
The second leading case disallowing private civil actions
72. Id. at 8-10. The policy favoring conciliation is established by sections 205 and
209(b) of Executive Order 11,246, 30 Fed. Reg. 12,319 (1965). Similar provisions were
present in the predecessor executive order that was under consideration in Farmer.
73. 329 F.2d at 10.
74. The Farmer opinion itself states: "[Wihether a district court could then
[after administrative remedies have been exhausted] entertain jurisdiction is not here
decided." 329 F.2d at 10. Thus, as the court pointed out in Lewis v. Western Airlines,
Inc., 379 F. Supp. 684, 687 (N.D. Cal. 1974), "The question of a private right of action
• ..was therefore expressly reserved by the court in Farmer."
75. E.g., Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 78 (1975); Stewart v. Travelers Corp., 503 F.2d
108 (9th Cir. 1974); see Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159 (1970); cf. Data Processing Serv.
v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970) (a person within the "zone of interests" sought to be
protected by a statute has standing to sue for its violation, whether or not an intended
beneficiary).
76. See text accompanying note 64 supra.
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under Executive Order 11246 is Farkas v. Texas Instruments
Inc. " As in Farmer, the plaintiffs allegedly discriminatory dis-
charge and blacklisting occurred prior to the effective date of
Title VII. An effort was therefore made to ground the claim
against the company on the Executive Order. The court's dis-
cussion of the private cause of action"8 was, unfortunately, ex-
tremely brief. After quoting at some length from the Farmer
opinion, the court merely stated its agreement with the conclu-
sion in Farmer that "the threat of a private civil action was not
contemplated by the orders."" The court ' then noted that
plaintiff had filed an administrative complaint, in which pro-
ceeding he had been denied relief. The court concluded that the
administrative decision was final and not subject to review by
a court of law.8 0 It dismissed the case for failure to state a cause
of action.
The holding of the Farkas case can be questioned on the
same general grounds as the reasoning in Farmer. The court
made several observations which, under present law, would no
longer lead to the same conclusion. First, it quoted with ap-
proval the following language from the Farmer opinion:
"[Tihe threat of a private civil action was not contemplated
by the orders."'" The lack of specific intent to create a private
cause of action is no longer viewed as dispositive. The lack of
specific intent on the issue is now viewed, absent other consid-
erations, as a basis for granting, rather than denying, the pri-
vate beneficiaries standing to sue."2
The Farkas court then postulated that in the absence of
other effective remedies, the inference would be strong that a
private cause of action should be allowed in order "to give
vitality to the contractual assurances of nondiscrimination." 3
It concluded, however, that other effective remedies were avail-
able and disallowed the private cause of action on that
77. 375 F.2d 629 (5th Cir. 1976). Farkas deals with Executive Order 10,925, 26
Fed. Reg. 1977 (1960), issued in 1961 by President Kennedy, and which is essentially
the same as Executive Order 11,246, lacking only the sexual discrimination language.
See text accompanying note 4 supra.
78. 375 F.2d at 632-33.
79. Id. at 633.
80. In support of this conclusion, the court cited Switchmen's Union v. National
Mediation Bd., 320 U.S. 297 (1943).
81. Farkas v. Texas Instrument, Inc., 375 F.2d 629, 633 (5th Cir. 1967).
82. See note 74 and accompanying text supra.
83. 375 F.2d at 633.
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ground. 4 Had the court understood the reality of administra-
tive nullification within the compliance program, and had it
examined the actual procedures involved in the administrative
complaint scheme," it might have realized that the adminis-
trative remedies are ineffective and that private enforcement
is indispensible "to give vitality" to affirmative action require-
ments. The court actually articulated one of the most compel-
ling reasons for allowing private enforcement, but then drew
the wrong conclusion, since it failed to recognize the extent and
effect of administrative nullification in the compliance pro-
gram.
Given the inadequacy of the federal compliance program,
private enforcement is the only hope for insuring that federal
subsidies to discriminatory private companies do not continue.
Since the Farmer-Farkas rule is outdated, it should no longer
be invoked to prohibit private enforcement actions." On the
contrary, the intended beneficiaries of Executive Order 11246
should be encouraged to seek enforcement of the affirmative
action duties of federal contractors and to litigate if necessary
to achieve this end.
Lewis v. Western Airlines. Recently, one case, Lewis v.
Western Airlines, Inc.,87 has recognized the defects in the
Farmer-Farkas reasoning and articulated the case for the pri-
vate cause of action.
Plaintiffs in the Lewis case brought an action against
Western Airlines alleging racial and sexual discrimination in
the airline's employment practices. In conjunction with a Title
VII claim, plaintiffs sought relief under Executive Order 11246,
naming officials of the responsible compliance agency, the Fed-
eral Aviation Administration, as additional defendants. Relief
in the nature of mandamus was sought against the federal offi-
cials to compel them to enforce the applicable regulations. De-
fendant Western Airlines moved to dismiss the claim for relief
under the Executive Order on the Farmer-Farkas theory that
84. Id.
85. The applicable regulations do not provide a right to a hearing, discovery
rights or a right of participation by the complainant. 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.21-.27 (1976).
86. Unfortunately, a number of cases decided since Farmer and Farkas have
cited the rule against private enforcement of Executive Order 11,246 with approval.
See, e.g., Freeman v. Schultz, 468 F.2d 120 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Blaze v. Moon, 440 F.2d
1348 (D.C. Cir. 1971); Gnotta v. United States, 415 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 397 U.S. 934 (1970); Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D.
Cal. 1975).
87. 379 F. Supp. 684 (N.D. Cal. 1974).
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it created no private cause of action against federal contractors.
In denying the motion to dismiss, the court pointed out
that Supreme Court cases subsequent to Farmer and Farkas
had changed the law by holding that silence on the issue of
private enforcement allowed such enforcement." The Court
then stressed a point overlooked in Farmer and Farkas, namely
that the Executive Order and supporting OFCCP regulations
anticipated the use of "numerous remedies" to achieve the
policy of nondiscrimination."9
The existence of a private cause of action was implicitly
acknowledged. The court stated:
Implying a private right of action from a statute or Execu-
tive Order should not become a device to undercut effec-
tive administrative remedies established by Congress or
pursuant to an Executive Order. To maintain a cause of
action against Defendant Western Airlines, Plaintiffs will
have to show, as they have pleaded, that they have ex-
hausted whatever administrative remedies were reasona-
bly available.10
The court implied that if plaintiffs succeeded in proving that
they had exhausted the administrative remedies, they would
be able to maintain a cause of action against the airline com-
pany.
At this point, when the court had almost held in favor of
the private cause of action against federal contractors under
the Executive Order, it went on to note:
The only relief plaintiffs seek directly under the Executive
Order is an injunction compelling the Secretary of Labor,
88. The court stated:
Data Processing Service v. Camp . .. and Barlow v. Collins ...
hold that an individual may bring a civil action to enforce or challenge a
federal regulatory statute or regulation, even if the statute or regulation
do [sic] not specifically confer such a right of action, provided the indi-
vidual can show he has a personal interest in the outcome of the litigation
which is within the zone of interests sought to be protected by the statute
or regulation in question.
Id. at 688.
89. Id. at 689, where the court stated:
Even the Regulations, however, do not contemplate that their approach
to the problem of employment must be exclusive. On the contrary, in
their determination to eliminate employment discrimination, which itself
is responsible for great social problems, Congress, the President, and
many states have provided numerous remedies, usually with the provi-
sions that they are not meant to repeal whatever other remedies might
exist.
90. Id. at 689.
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the Director of the Office of Contracts [sic] Compliance,
and the Federal Aviation Administration to comply with
their mandate under the Executive Order and the Regula-
tions. A writ of mandate is available to provide this relief.
Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan, supra.
Because Western Airlines' interests are integrally involved
in this proceeding and would be substantially affected by
the relief Plaintiffs seek under the Executive Order, it is a
proper party to this action. F.R.Civ.P. Rule 19(a)(2)."
This language implies that the private cause of action is,
in actuality, solely against the federal agency and that the
company is named only as a "proper party" who might be
adversely affected by the claim against the agency. The court
found that other relief sought was available under Title VII and
other statutes." The Lewis case is nevertheless encouraging
since it points out the weakness of the Farmer-Farkas reason-
ing and implies that a cause of action against federal contrac-
tors is appropriate. To date, Lewis v. Western Airlines, Inc.
remains the strongest authority for the proposition that private
enforcement of Executive Order 11246 against contractors is
authorized.
A subsequent case in the Northern District of California,
Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc.93 has retreated to the Farmer-
Farkas rule. The Traylor court based its analysis on two Su-
preme Court cases which held that the existence of a private
right of action by members of the class of persons intended to
be protected by a law depended on the legislative intent and
whether private enforcement would be consistent with the un-
derlying purpose of the statutory scheme. 4 According to the
Traylor opinion, Executive Order 11246 does not manifest an
express or implied intent on the issue of private enforcement,
therefore resolution of the issue depends on whether private
enforcement would be "disruptive of the administrative
scheme" of enforcement. 5 The court rejected the private cause
of action on the ground that it would, in fact, be disruptive of
the administrative scheme."
91. Id.
92. Id. at 689 n.4.
93. 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
94. Id. at 875, citing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 78 (1975) and Securities Investor
Protection Corp. v. Barbour, 421 U.S. 875 (1975).
95. 402 F. Supp. at 875.
96. Id.
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This conclusion appears to be incorrect. Administrative
nullification is so prevalent within the federal compliance pro-
gram that there is essentially no meaningful administrative
process to disrupt. For example, the United States Department
of Agriculture (USDA), the compliance agency responsible for
Safeway (the defendant in the Traylor case) and the rest of the
food processing industry, has no compliance officers in the en-
tire state of California97 and the USDA compliance staff rarely
comes to California except in response to private complaints.
In addition, it has consistently approved AAP's which did not
comply with the requirements of Revised Order No. 4.Y8 Private
enforcement, far from being disruptive, appears to be the only
hope for enforcement of Executive Order 11246 in the huge
California agribusiness industry. By overlooking facts such as
these, the courts in Traylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc."5 and other
similar cases' 0 have failed to recognize administrative nullifi-
cation of Executive Order 11246 and have allowed federal sub-
sidies for private discrimination to continue.
The Judicial Creation of Administrative Barriers to the
Enforcement of a Basic Constitutional Right
As the foregoing discussion indicates, the courts have un-
necessarily rejected a weapon which could be used against the
administrative nullification of Executive Order 11246, namely
the private cause of action against federal contractors. To this
extent, the courts have ratified the administrative nullification
and have become partners in the perpetuation of discrimina-
tion by federal contractors.
Executive Order 11246 is concerned with companies hold-
ing federal contracts, i.e., companies making major profits
from federal tax dollars. In effect, Executive Order 11246 ad-
dresses the problem of the perpetuation of discrimination
through the equivalent of public subsidies. This adds a consti-
tutional dimension to the issue. It is arguably unconstitutonal
97. Interviews with William Gladden, then director of the USDA Compliance
Program and other USDA compliance officials (1973).
98. See, e.g., Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125, 139 (N.D. Cal. 1974),
appeal docketed sub nor. Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974), holding that
all 29 written affirmative action programs approved by the USDA in early 1973 were
illegal since they did not comply with the most fundamental requirements of Revised
Order No. 4.
99. 402 F. Supp. 871 (N.D. Cal. 1975).
100. See note 86 supra.
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for public agencies to underwrite private discrimination. The
equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment has in
fact been held to prohibit state agencies from contracting with
discriminatory private companies for the construction of public
buildings.""1 Similar restrictions against becoming "partners"
in private discrimination theoretically apply to the federal gov-
ernment by virtue of the fifth amendment due process clause.'"'
Normally, when unconstitutional action by government
agencies is alleged, the courts take firm action to provide reme-
dies. However, in this situation the courts have in fact erected
barriers to the vindication of fundamental rights. For example,
in Hadnott v. Laird, "3 plaintiffs sought to enjoin the Depart-
ment of Defense from contracting with certain companies
which had allegedly persisted in discriminatory employment
practices. Instead of allowing plaintiffs to present their evi-
dence, the Hadnott court held that plaintiffs had to file com-
plaints against the contractors and proceed through the admin-
istrative machinery under Executive Order 11246. This re-
quirement of exhaustion of administrative remedies is essen-
tially useless because the agencies rarely find against respon-
dent companies.'"' In addition, the hearing procedures lack the
compulsory discovery procedures needed to prove the compa-
nies' discrimination. Indeed, the procedures traditionally have
not even provided for participation by the complaining parties.
Finally, the agencies do not have sufficient staffs to investigate
and consider such complaints properly.
In short, Hadnott v. Laird channels the vindication of
important constitutional rights through an inept compliance
system before allowing full adversary judicial proceedings."'
101. See, e.g., Ethridge v. Rhodes, 268 F. Supp. 83 (S.D. Ohio 1967); Todd v.
Joint Apprenticeship Comm., 223 F. Supp. 12 (N.D. Ill. 1963) (injunction issued where
state agency made racial discrimination in iron construction work possible); cf. NLRB
v. Mansion House Center Management Corp., 473 F.2d 471 (8th Cir. 1973) (National
Labor Relations Act not available to union unwilling to correct racial discrimination
practices).
102. Cf. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (racial segregation in public
schools of District of Columbia violates due process of law guaranteed by the fifth
amendment).
103. 317 F. Supp. 379 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 463 F.2d 304 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
104. See, e.g., Letter from James W. Chin to Russell Specter (May 8, 1976) on
file at SANTA CLARA L. REv.]. Mr. Chin, compliance officer for the Department of
Defense, states in his letter: "Minority and Female complainants against government
contractors do not have a fair investigation by our office (DCASR, Region 9). If I were
to examine the records, I would estimate 95% of the investigative findings have held
for the government contractor."
105. A similar effort to force discrimination claims under the Civil Rights Act of
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Thus, Executive Order 11246 has been transformed from a po-
tentially far-reaching affirmative weapon in the struggle
against discrimination into an actual barrier against efforts to
cut off federal funds to private discriminators. These judicial
developments constitute judicial ratification of the administra-
tive nullification of Executive Order 11246.
The Third Party Beneficiary Theory
Another blow to private enforcement of affirmative action
requirements, at least in California, was struck in Martinez v.
Socoma Companies, ' where the California Supreme Court
held that the beneficiaries of the Economic Opportunity Act of
1964,107 could not bring suit as third party beneficiaries to en-
force the employment and training provision in federal con-
tracts with private companies. Prior to Martinez, arguments
supporting application of third party beneficiary law in the
affirmation action context seemed quite promising. California
has a statute that specifically provides: "A contract, made ex-
pressly for the benefit of a third person, may be enforced by
him at any time before the parties thereto rescind it."'° Since
the affirmative action provisions required by Executive Order
11246 are included in federal contracts expressly for the benefit
of protected groups, the statute seems to apply.
A lower court case was apparently on point."9 That case
involved private enforcement of contract provisions contained
in Veterans Administration construction contracts. The con-
tracts required contractors to meet certain specifications in
building subsidized housing for veterans. After the houses had
been completed and purchased by veterans, the new owners
discovered that some of the specifications had been violated.
The veterans, who were not parties to the original construction
contracts, brought suit as third party beneficiaries to recover
damages. The court held that the suit was proper. Since the
veterans were the intended beneficiaries of the contract specifi-
cations, they could sue under Civil Code Section 1559 to en-
1866, 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1970), through the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion administrative machinery created by Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was
explicitly rejected by the United States Supreme Court in Johnson v. Railway Express
Co., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
106. 11 Cal. 3d 394, 521 P.2d 841, 113 Cal. Rptr. 584 (1974).
107. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2995 (1970).
108. CAL. CIv. CODE § 1559 (West 1954).
109. Shell v. Schmidt, 126 Cal. App. 2d 279, 272 P.2d 82 (1954).
[Vol. 17
ADMINISTRATIVE NULLIFICATION
force the specifications. 10
Martinez v. Socoma Companies raised a major obstacle to
third party beneficiary suits to enforce the affirmative action
provisions of federal contracts. Under the Economic Opportun-
ity Act of 1964, the Department of Labor was authorized to
fund programs designed to employ and train "hard-core un-
employed residents" of certain designated "Special Impact
areas." The Department designated East Los Angeles as a spe-
cial impact area and entered into contracts with several com-
panies under which, in return for substantial federal grants, the
companies agreed to employ and train area residents certified
as eligible by the Department. Although the companies re-
ceived nearly $1.5 million in federal funds, they failed to pro-
vide the jobs and training specified in the contracts. Plaintiffs,
members of the class of persons certified as eligible, brought
suit to recover damages.
The California Supreme Court held that plaintiffs had no
standing, and dismissed the case. The court framed the issue
as whether or not plaintiffs had standing to enforce the con-
tracts as third party beneficiaries. The answer depended on the
meaning of section 1559 of the Civil Code which provided sim-
ply that "[a] contract, made expressly for the benefit of a
third person, may be enforced by him.""' The dissent argued
that the contract provisions calling for the training and em-
ployment were expressly intended for the benefit of plaintiffs
and their fellow class members, therefore section 1559 was
applicable and the suit was appropriate.'
The majority came to the opposite conclusion. It held that
the certified unemployed residents of East Los Angeles could
not sue the companies for failure to deliver the promised jobs
and training."3 To begin, the court noted that section 1559
applies only to persons "expressly" intended to be the benefici-
aries of the contract. Rather than simply giving effect to the
apparent meaning of the language, however, the court grafted
110. Id. at 291, 272 P.2d at 90.
111. See note 108 supra.
112. Martinez v. Socoma Co., 11 Cal. 3d 394, 409-10, 521 P.2d 841, 851, 113 Cal.
Rptr. 584, 595 (1974). As the dissent noted, the contracts in question explicitly de-
scribed their purposes as follows: "to help find jobs and provide training for thousands
of the Nation's hardcore unemployed" and "to provide training and work opportunities
for such seriously disadvantaged persons." Id. (quoting from the preambles of the
contracts).
113. Id. at 407, 521 P.2d at 849-50, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 593-94.
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the entire body of common law third party beneficiary theory
onto the statute. Under traditional common law rules, only
"creditor" or donee beneficiaries can sue as third party benefi-
ciaries; all other beneficiaries are considered "incidental bene-
ficiaries" and may not sue."' Without encouragement from the
language of the statute, the court imported these common law
definitions into section 1559 and found "expressly" to mean not
incidentally. Thus, all persons other than creditor and donee
beneficiaries are incidental beneficiaries at best, and therefore,
are not entitled to sue under section 1559.
Rephrased in these terms, the issue was whether plaintiffs
were either creditor or donee beneficiaries. The unemployed
residents of East Los Angeles were not creditor beneficiaries,
since the government owed them no duty to provide jobs and
training. Nor were they donee beneficiaries, since the benefits
under the contracts were not gifts. Had they been gifts, the
residents could have enforced the promises. Here, however, the
benefits were not gifts; the court found that they were a means
for carrying out the public policy of alleviating underemploy-
ment. It stated that "[t]he benefits of such programs are pro-
vided not simply as gifts to the recipients but as a means of
accomplishing a larger public purpose.""' Therefore, the con-
tracts were not enforceable by these beneficiaries.
It would seem that the presence of a "larger public pur-
pose" would make it more important that effective enforce-
ment be allowed. If a government program offering mere gifts
would be enforceable by the private beneficiaries, it would
seem to follow that a program offering benefits to carry out an
urgent public purpose should also be enforceable by the private
beneficiaries. The decision of the court, unfortunately, was to
the contrary.
The similarities of Martinez to the Executive Order situa-
tion are obvious: a government contract; implementation of an
important public policy; a call for employment of underem-
ployed groups; and administration by the Department of
Labor. Since Martinez did not involve Executive Order 11246,
it is not directly controlling with regard to enforcement of af-
firmative action contract requirements. It may still be possible,
by distinguishing the case, to establish third party beneficiary
114. Id. at 400-01, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
115. Id. at 401, 521 P.2d at 845, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 589.
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enforcement rights for affirmative action requirements."' But
the chances of success are not great, at least in California.
To summarize, the courts have in many instances ratified
the administrative nullification of Executive Order 11246 by
rejecting private enforcement efforts. They have rejected the
private cause of action against contractors. They have disal-
lowed direct lawsuits based on constitutional grounds to bar
the government from contracting with persistent discrimina-
tors. And, at least in California, they may have blocked the use
of third party beneficiary contract suits. As a result, Executive
Order 11246 has been converted from a weapon against dis-
crimination into a shield, diverting complaints of discrimina-
tion into an ineffective administration system.
THE RAY OF HOPE - LEGAL THEORIES WHICH STILL PROVIDE A
BASIS FOR ENFORCING EXECUTIVE ORDER 11246.
The courts have not entirely disregarded the intended ben-
eficiaries of Executive Order 11246. There are still several via-
ble legal weapons available to upgrade the quality of the fed-
eral compliance program.
As a preliminary matter, it is important to note that dis-
closure of basic compliance data necessary for enforcement can
in theory be obtained pursuant to the Freedom of Information
Act." 7 This act established the general rule that any identifia-
ble document in the possesssion of the federal government
must be disclosed, upon payment of certain costs, unless it is
within the scope of one of the several exceptions set forth in the
Act. Although the issue has not been settled, the majority of
lower federal courts have held that the documents containing
the most important compliance data concerning federal con-
tractors are subject to disclosure."'
Several documents are needed to determine whether fed-
eral contractors and compliance agencies are complying with
116. For example, the court stressed the fact that the contract in Martinez had
a provision for liquidated damages payable to the government. This, the court felt,
indicated an intent to limit liability to the liquidated amount. 11 Cal. 3d at 402, 521
P.2d at 846, 113 Cal. Rptr. at 590. No such provision appears in federal affirmative
action contract provisions.
117. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1966).
118. See, e.g., Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv. Administration, 384 F.
Supp. 996 (D.D.C. 1974), aff'd, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Hughes Aircraft Co. v.
Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 292 (C.D. Cal. 1974); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp.
771 (N.D. Cal. 1972). But see Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Schlesinger, 542 F.2d 1190
(4th Cir. 1976).
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applicable regulations. First, work force statistics are neces-
sary. The most important work force statistics are EEO-I's
(Standard Forms 100). 1 EEO-I's of federal contractors must
be disclosed upon request.2 0 The contractor's AAP's are also
needed. These must also be disclosed if the agency has cop-
ies. 2 ' Compliance review reports prepared by the compliance
agency assigned to the case are necessary, and must be dis-
closed. 2 In short, it is possible to obtain the basic data needed
to detect at least the most serious noncompliance by federal
contractors and compliance agencies.
Assuming one has obtained the relevant compliance data
and can prove that noncompliance exists, enforcement must
somehow be achieved. As the discussion in the preceding sec-
tion shows, it is probably not possible to sue the company
directly and obtain orders requiring it to comply. An alterna-
tive route, is available, however, by bringing an action against
officers of the responsible federal agency.
There are several jurisdictional bases available for actions
to compel compliance personnel to obey applicable regulations.
First, if a public official violates a specific regulation, an order
in the nature of mandamus can be obtained compelling the
officer to comply with the regulation. 3 Second, judicial review
of the administrative action can be obtained under the Admin-
istrative Procedure Act2 4 (APA). Under this statute, the courts
have power to enjoin agency action that is not in accordance
with law, or is an abuse of discretion.'25 Third, the general
jurisdiction of the federal district courts over federal questions
involving more than $10,000 can also be invoked.' Although
these are technically different jurisdictional grounds, the argu-
ments presented are the same, regardless of the jurisdictional
basis of the action. They will therefore be treated as one, a
mandamus-APA action.
119. See note 35 supra.
120. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv. Administration, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 41 C.F.R. §
60-40.2(b) (1976).
121. Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. General Serv. Administration, 509 F.2d 527 (D.C.
Cir. 1974); Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972); 41 C.F.R. §
60-40.2(b)(1) (1976).
122. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Shultz, 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
123. 28 U.S.C. § 1361 (1976).
124. 5 U.S.C. §§ 701-706 (1966).
125. Id. § 706(2)(A) (1966).
126. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976). The federal question is whether the duly enacted
federal Executive Order and regulations are being violated by federal officials.
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These bases can be reconciled with the Farmer-Farkas rule
precluding a private cause of action to enforce the Executive
Order. The cases hold only that there is no private cause of
action against the contractors. They do not reject a claim for
relief against federal officials who violate the law.'
It may be helpful to spell out explicitly why the Farmer-
Farkas rule prohibiting private suits against federal con-
tractors under Executive Order 11246 does not prevent suits
against federal compliance officials. A variety of considerations
justify distinguishing between private suits directly against
contractors and mandamus-APA actions against compliance
officials.'
First, the Farmer-Farkas courts were concerned that al-
lowing direct suits against federal contractors would encourage
private parties to by-pass administrative enforcement, thereby
thwarting the Executive Order's preference for resolution of
disputes through conciliation and mediation.' Analysis of the
Farmer opinion leaves no doubt that this was a major factor in
the formulation of the rule. Whether or not this concern is
justified in the context of suits against contractors, there is no
danger that mandamus-APA actions will by-pass the adminis-
trative process or thwart conciliation efforts. Since the concilia-
tion requirements are included in the rules which plaintiffs in
a mandamus-APA action seek to enforce, a court order requir-
ing compliance with these rules will not avoid the conciliation
process. To the contrary, mandamus orders requiring the agen-
cies to carry out their enforcement duties should result in an
127. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal
docketed sub nom. Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974). The distinction
between a private cause of action against particular contractors and a mandamus
action against the responsible compliance officials was also recognized in Traylor v.
Safeway Stores, Inc., 402 F. Supp. 871, 876 (N.D. Cal. 1975), where the court stated:
Plaintiffs' reliance on Legal Aid Society of Alameda County v. Brennan
is simply misplaced. That case involved suit for mandamus to re-
quire the relevant officials to enforce the provisions of the executive order,
not the claim of an individual seeking recovery for injuries allegedly
suffered as a result of a contractor's noncompliance. The court specifi-
cally stated that the cases refusing to imply a private right of action were
simply inapplicable ... , an unchallengable conclusion in view of the
different policy considerations.
128. The issue whether lawsuits will be allowed against federal compliance offi-
cials to enforce duties imposed upon them by Executive Order 11,246 and its support-
ing regulations, has recently been presented to the Ninth Circuit and is now awaiting
decision. Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal
docketed sub noma. Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974).
129. See note 49 supra.
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increase in conciliation. For example, court intervention in
Legal Aid Society v. Brennan'30 resulted in conciliation be-
tween USDA and twenty-nine contractors which would proba-
bly not have been achieved but for the suit. The concern for
conciliation therefore favors mandamus actions.
Second, there is an important difference between enforce-
ment suits against individual contractors and suits against fed-
eral compliance agencies in terms of the burden on the courts.
Recognition of a private cause of action against federal contrac-
tors might increase the burden on the courts by inviting a
substantial number of suits against companies accused of vio-
lating Executive Order 11246. Mandamus actions against com-
pliance officers to compel enforcement of the Executive Order
would tend to reduce rather than increase the burden on fed-
eral courts. One of the heaviest burdens on federal courts since
the mid-1960's has been employment discrimination litigation.
Some of this burden could be removed if compliance agencies
forced federal contractors to fulfill their affirmative obligation
to eradicate discrimination. Effective compliance enforcement
could mean fewer suits under Title VII. Moreover, the manda-
mus action involves a multiplier effect that would be beneficial
in reducing court burdens; a single mandamus order requiring
a compliance agency to perform its enforcement duties could
affect the thousands of contractors subject to that agency's
jurisdiction.
Third, there is an important distinction between the
Farmer-Farkas private cause of action and a mandamus action
in terms of effecting a remedy for the problem addressed. In the
mandamus context, the problem is the failure of a compliance
agency to enforce Executive Order 11246 and its regulations.
Such failures normally affect all of the agency's assigned con-
tractors. Such a problem cannot be remedied by filing adminis-
trative complaints against the affected companies. For exam-
ple, the violations in the USDA compliance program alleged in
Legal Aid Society v. Brennan3' involved its supervision of all
of the 18,000 contractors assigned to the agency. To handle the
problem via complaints against individual contractors could
have necessitated 18,000 administrative complaints and the
approach would have failed, since the compliance agency did
130. 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal docketed sub noma. Castillo v.




not agree that its actions were illegal. Where the complaint
involves discrimination by a specific contractor, the Farmer-
Farkas rule requiring individual administrative complaints
may have some validity. In the mandamus situation, where the
complaint involves the conduct of the supervising agency itself,
and by implication all of its assigned contractors, the Farmer-
Farkas approach is wholly futile.
Fourth, there is a difference between Farmer-Farkas suits
and mandamus-APA actions in terms of the nature of the issue
presented for adjudication. In Farmer and Farkas, plaintiffs
asked the courts to hear the equivalent of a Title VII action,
and determine whether the contractor was guilty of racial dis-
crimination against its employees. In the mandamus-APA situ-
ation, the issue is simpler and more manageable; namely,
whether the agency is complying with mandatory, clearly de-
fined duties imposed by applicable regulations. In the typical
mandamus-APA action, this issue can be resolved by summary
judgment without the drawnout complexities that plague Title
VII litigation.
Fifth, and perhaps most important, the extension of the
Farmer-Farkas rule to the mandamus-APA situation would
result in administrative insulation unintended by those cases.
The Farmer-Farkas rule, as it originated, was limited to suits
against contractors. It therefore left open an avenue for pre-
venting serious administrative lawlessness by the compliance
agencies; namely, a mandamus-APA action. Thus, the Farmer-
Farkas rule does not insulate administrative lawlessness from
judicial review. If the rule is extended to mandamus actions,
however, it will deprive the courts of authority to order compli-
ance agencies to enforce their own rules. Such a result would
differ drastically from that in Farmer and Farkas; it would
release the agencies from their duty to obey OFCCP regula-
tions, by placing the entire federal compliance program beyond
judicial supervision.
It is simply incorrect to say that there is no difference
between a private cause of action against individual contrac-
tors and a mandamus action to compel federal compliance offi-
cials to enforce the provisions of the Executive Order and its
supporting regulations. To the contrary, the five reasons stated
above provide an ample basis for viewing the two kinds of cases
differently. Indeed, the reasons which support the rule against
a private cause of action cut in precisely the opposite direction
when mandamus actions against compliance officials are con-
sidered.
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Another legal principle, independent of the foregoing, also
compels the conclusion that mandamus actions should be al-
lowed under Executive Order 11246. The rule concerning pri-
vate enforcement of federal law has changed since the Farmer
and Farkas'32 decisions. The earlier rule did not allow private
enforcement unless an express or implied intent to do so could
be found in the language or legislative history of the particular
law at issue. The new rule, as enunciated in Cort v. Ash 33 and
other cases,' 34 permits private enforcement, even absent such
intent, where that enforcement aids in achieving the objectives
of the law.
If rules concerning private rights of enforcement are ap-
plicable in the context of a mandamus action, the test under
Cort v. Ash3 5 is whether private suits will aid or hinder attain-
ing the objective of Executive Order 11246. Assuming for the
sake of argument that Farmer and Farkas are correct, that pri-
vate suits against individual contractors would disrupt the en-
forcement of the Executive Order, the opposite is true with
regard to mandamus actions against the agencies. The De-
partment of Labor is charged with the duty of insuring that
the Executive Order is enforced. To fulfill this duty, the
Department of Labor has prepared a detailed body of regula-
tions. The compliance agencies, however, because of their
commitment to other interests and constituencies, fail to obey
the regulations. In this situation, since the Department of
Labor alone cannot insure enforcement of its regulations, the
courts must be able to require adherence to the regulations or
the compliance system will collapse.
There is absolutely no doubt that mandamus actions will
aid in the enforcement of the Executive Order.' 36 Indeed, they
are indispensable, since they offer the only method of forcing
compliance agencies to obey the rules promulgated by the
OFCCP for the enforcement of affirmative action require-
ments.
Suits like Legal Aid Society v. Schultz137 and Legal Aid
132. See note 75 and accompanying text supra.
133. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
134. See note 75 supra.
135. 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
136. The trial court in Legal Aid Soc'y v. Brennan, 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal.
1974), appeal docketed sub nom. Castillo v. Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974), specifi-
cally found that the benefits of a court order outweighed any burdens imposed on the
compliance agency in that case.
137. 349 F. Supp. 771 (N.D. Cal. 1972).
[Vol. 17
ADMINISTRATIVE NULLIFICATION
Society v. Brennan'8 are clearly not a panacea for administra-
tive nullification of Executive Order 11246. With the aid of
these legal weapons, however, private citizens and groups such
as NAACP, the National Organization of Women, IMAGE and
Urban League could detect and correct at least some of the
most serious examples of noncompliance.
In order to make such mandamus actions more effective,
it is proposed that whenever the evidence demonstrates that
administrative nullification exists in an executive agency, the
scope of review accorded by the judiciary be expanded. The
courts should discard their traditional deference and assume a
more active role in ensuring that legal rules are enforced. In
most instances, courts are reluctant to order administrative
agencies to act in a specific way, and for good reason. Agencies
are often more able to determine the best way to deal with
problems in their area of responsibility. Relative to the admin-
istrative agency, courts have limited monitoring ability and
very little administrative capacity to enforce complex reme-
dies. Indiscriminate judicial forays into areas of government
run by executive agencies are not appropriate.
There are fact situations, however, which warrant closer
judicial scrutiny than others. For example, during the 1950's
and 1960's, the Supreme Court recognized that claims involv-
ing discrimination against insular minority groups, including
racial minorities, required special attention, since these
groups, as a result of their minority status, could not obtain
redress through the majoritarian political process.' 9 Thus, is-
sues such as school desegregation became a special concern of
the judiciary. It was recognized that the executive branch can-
not be relied upon to resist majoritarian pressure and enforce
unpopular laws, therefore the judiciary must play a more active
role in securing enforcement of these laws.
The courts should create another exception to the tradi-
tional rule of judicial deference in cases where there is substan-
tial evidence that administrative nullification is occurring.
Typical patterns of administrative nullification such as those
138. 381 F. Supp. 125 (N.D. Cal. 1974), appeal docketed sub noma. Castillo v.
Usery, No. 74-3234 (9th Cir. 1974).
139. See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938),
which first raised the question "whether prejudice against discrete and insular minori-
ties may be a special condition which tends seriously to curtail the operation of those
political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect minorities and which may
call for a correspondingly more searching judicial inquiry."
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described above can serve as tests for determining whether
nullification exists. If a plaintiff can demonstrate that these
patterns are present, the court should suspend the normal as-
sumption of administrative good faith and scrutinize the con-
duct of the administrative agency more closely. The burden of
proof should perhaps shift to the agency, which would then
have to demonstrate a convincing basis for its decision.
It should be noted that expansion of judicial supervision
over the executive branch is not an unequivocal blessing. At
the same time, the executive branch must not be allowed to
nullify duly enacted laws. A major duty of the judiciary is to
remedy the violation of legal rules, and it should fulfill that
duty when the executive branch effectively nullifies laws which
it is charged with enforcing.
CONCLUSION
The federal affirmative action system is potentially a
strong force in the struggle to eliminate employment discrimi-
nation. This potential remains largely unrealized because the
agencies charged with compliance responsibility have nullified
rather than enforced the law. In this situation, the success of
the compliance program depends, in large part, on the willing-
ness of the courts to order federal contractors and compliance
agencies to obey their legal duties. To an unfortunate degree,
the courts have failed to perform this function. They have re-
jected suits against federal contractors accused of violating af-
firmative action duties, and have refused to allow minorities to
seek orders requiring contract debarmerit. In so doing, the
courts have become passive partners in the perpetuation of
private discrimination, and have converted Executive Order
11246 into a barrier against legitimate efforts to cut off federal
funds to discriminatory contractors.
It is proposed that the courts should play a more active
role in securing compliance with Executive Order 11246. The
anomalous rule prohibiting private enforcement suits against
contractors should be overturned. Vigorous action to compel
federal officials to carry out their enforcement duties is neces-
sary to achieve compliance. Moreover, in order to offset execu-
tive lawlessness, the courts should discard judicial restraint
and deference where there is evidence that administrative offi-
cials are nullifying rather than enforcing the law. It has often
been said that the government is the omnipresent educator.
1977] ADMINISTRATIVE NULLIFICATION 593
The failure of the government itself to obey the law teaches
that lawlessness is an appropriate form of behavior. It is long
past time for the federal government to end executive lawless-
ness within the affirmative action field.

